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ABSTRACT
Existing solutions for tracking sensitive data and enforcing data
usage policies have been intertwined with a specific host language—
and multiple host languages in the case of database-backed appli-
cations. In this paper, we present an alternate, policy-agnostic ap-
proach that automatically enforces API-specific policies. We demon-
strate that by associating policy enforcement with the API between
the application and database, it is possible to automatically enforce
rich and expressive policies across database-backed applications
without depending on the application or database language. We
present Estrela, a web framework that allows the specification of
rich and expressive policies separately from the code and enforces
the policies in a highly context-dependent manner. Estrela supports
both query-level policies that are applied during data-access, and
row-level policies that are more granular, complex and contextual.
Estrela works with legacy applications without requiring any mod-
ification to the application code or the database for enforcing the
policies. We build a prototype of Estrela and a language-agnostic
version of Estrela in Python, on top of Django. We evaluate its per-
formance and effectiveness by showing its application to a forum
software, a social-networking site, a conference management sys-
tem, and a company intranet. Estrela adds low overhead to existing
applications and supports easy migration of existing applications
for policy-compliance.
1 INTRODUCTION
As web applications become more complex, it becomes increasingly
difficult to ensure correct enforcement of access policies across
the application. Ensuring policy enforcement across component
boundaries is particularly difficult because it requires coordinating
checks across different systems.
While it may seem that database management system (DBMS)
access control mechanisms should suffice for handling web appli-
cation policies, properly handling current compliance mandates re-
quire additional context and flexibility. For example, some sections
of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
privacy rule [22] rule restrict the use or disclosure of protected
health information (PHI) for marketing or research, while other
sections allow disclosure if the patient is in need of emergency treat-
ment. The data minimization principle from the European Union
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [12] stipulates that
users should not see more data than they are supposed to see. En-
forcing these policies depends on context, purpose, and—especially
for applications with complex policies—application state.
As existing DBMS access control mechanisms alone cannot fully
enforce these policies, enforcement typically involves inline checks
scattered throughout the application. This is tedious, error-prone,
and difficult to audit. Moreover, as the policy enforcement is deeply
intertwined with the application’s implementation, modifications
to the policy must be propagated throughout the code and changes
to the application need to consider impact on enforcement. Policy-
agnostic programming [1, 38] factors out access policies from the
rest of the application, but prior work on policy-agnostic program-
ming is tailored to specific application and database languages.
The goal of our work is to design an approach to web program-
ming that supports the automated enforcement of expressive, high-
level policies across generic application and database languages.
We want to (1) allow the specification and enforcement of rich
and contextual fine-grained access policies, (2) separate the speci-
fication of policies from both application and database code, and
and (3) supports easy migration of legacy applications to be policy-
compliant without modifying the application code or the database.
The main challenge in doing this lies in the fact that contextual,
state-dependent policies are usually enforced in a manner deeply
intertwined with the application.
In this paper, we present a generalized approach for enforcing
policies at the component boundary level. This approach is based
on the insight that we if we design an interface between two com-
ponents that additionally accepts context information, then the
system could be responsible for doing the appropriate checking at
the component boundary. We show that we can implement our ap-
proach either in an entirely language-agnostic manner or in a more
optimized manner specific to the database language. We present
Estrela, a web framework that addresses the challenge of enforcing
rich context-dependent privacy policies across applications and
databases. In Estrela, developers specify policies explicitly using a
specialized API. The application code and back-end database both
remain unchanged, making it easier to implement, modify, and
audit both the policy and application.
Estrela supports fine-grained, contextual policies. Policies in
Estrela are factored into query-level and row-level components.
Database accesses throughout the application are subject to query-
level policies, which are enforced by rewriting queries in a manner
similar to Qapla [18]. Additionally, Estrela supports row-level poli-
cies that provide the necessary flexibility by associating policies
with every row in the result of an executed query. Such policies
can be thought of as context-specific policies that operate at a
finer-granularity with more contextual information, and are used
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alongside generic query-level policies for complete mediation. How-
ever, as it is often the case that the various APIs exposed by a web
application access the same rows and fields in a database under
different contexts and purposes, policies need to be API-specific.
Modern web applications run multiple services, e.g., microser-
vices, often implemented in several languages with a common
back-end database. Such an architecture makes policy enforcement
more challenging, requiring:
(1) a separate policy specification and enforcement mechanism for
every language used in the application.
(2) redundant policy specifications for each service resulting in
additional maintenance and update costs.
We address these challenges by showing how Estrela’s policy en-
forcement mechanism can be made language-agnostic using a cen-
tral remote policy-server that intervenes on messages passed be-
tween services and enforces policies. While this may incur a mod-
erate performance cost, it allows gradual migration of large ap-
plications written in different languages to Estrela for enforcing
policy-compliance without requiring multiple specifications and
enforcement mechanisms.
Finally, we demonstrate how Estrela can be applied in practice.
We have implemented Estrela in Python, extending the Django
framework [11]. Estrela policies are specified in Python, and make
use of Django’s object-relational mapping for data access. This al-
lows easy migration of legacy Django applications to Estrela with-
out requiring modifications to the API code or database. We have
used our implementation to build several applications with com-
plex policy requirements: a port of the Spirit forum software [32]
and open-source social-networking site Vataxia [26], modified to
enforce fine-grained privacy policies that restrict how users access
topics, other users’ posts and profiles; a conference management
system built on top of Jacqueline [37] used for an academic work-
shop ported to Estrela; and as a microbenchmark, an intranet web
app that manages the profile and compensation details of employ-
ees, and facilitates events and meetings. Using these applications,
we show that Estrela incurs very low overhead over the original ap-
plications where policies are inlined throughout the code. When the
remote policy-server is used for enforcement, Estrela incurs mod-
erate overhead due to the additional communication cost needed
to interpose on service requests.
To summarize, the contributions of this work are:
• We design and implement Estrela, a policy-agnostic web
framework that supports rich context- and purpose-depen-
dent policies on sensitive data. By maintaining strong sep-
aration between policy, code, and data, Estrela does not
require modifications to the back-end database, and sim-
plifies policy implementation and modification.
• Anovel policy framework that factors web app policies into
query- and row-level components. This allows policies to
make use of application-specific information about context
and purpose as needed without requiring extensive policy
specification throughout the implementation.
• We show how policies can be enforced using two mecha-
nisms: a built-in runtime that in a language-agnostic man-
ner allows applications developed in different languages
to easily integrate with Estrela.
Table Fields
User id, name, age, address, dept
Payroll id, mgid, salary
EventCalendar eid, date, location, orgid, event
Invitee eid, empid
Table 1: Database schema for a company’s intranet website
• We evaluate Estrela by using it to build four case study
applications ranging from 1000 LOC to 80 kLOC, and show
that it incurs an average overhead of ∼1.5%while requiring
minimal changes to existing application code.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we
present an overview of Estrela, giving several examples that il-
lustrate how it can be put to use enforcing complex policies. In
Section 3, we present the framework in more detail, and describe
our prototype implementation of it. In Section 4, we discuss policy
enforcement methods, and in Section 5 we present our evaluation.
Sections 6 and 7 are the related work and conclusion, respectively.
2 OVERVIEW: ESTRELA BY EXAMPLE
Estrela is a web framework that assists the developer in building
policy-compliant applications. In Estrela, a policy is specified cen-
trally alongside the database schema, and the runtime ensures that
the policy is enforced correctly across all application components.
Estrela is built on top of Django [11], a model-view-controller frame-
work in Python where the model describes the database schema, the
view describes the application’s rendering, and the controller han-
dles inputs to the application. Django includes an object-relational
mapping (ORM) to interact with data in different databases. It con-
structs SQL queries, also known as querysets, based on the ORM
functions and filter conditions. Evaluation of a queryset object ex-
ecutes the query on the database and retrieves the relevant rows
as the result. The query-level policies work on a queryset and are
applied before the queryset is evaluated, i.e., the data is actually
fetched from the database. On the other hand, the row-level policies
apply on the result of evaluation of a queryset.
Using an intranet website for a large organization as a running
example, this section describes example Estrela policies and their
specifications. The intranet provides different services to employ-
ees like viewing personal employee details, payroll information,
and setting up meetings and events within the organization. It
also provides a service to befriend other employees that is used to
define various data access policies. The schema for the back-end
database of this application is shown in Table 1. Briefly, the User
field contains the personal details of the company’s employees; the
Payroll field stores the details of employee salaries along with their
manager’s identifier; the EventCalendar field records the events or
meetings organized within the company while Invitee stores the
list of employees invited to each event.
Example 1 (Query-level access control). Suppose that the site en-
forces a policy that allows either the name or the age of the employ-
ees to be accessed separately, but data linking the name and the age
should only be accessible to the employee whose name and age is
being accessed, or to an employee from the HR department. This
is a basic access-control policy that defines what data is accessible
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by a user in terms of the database state, and can be specified as a
query-level policy in Estrela. Query-level policies are identified by
the annotation pre at the beginning of the policy following the list
of columns on which the policy applies, as shown below:
User.name, User.age; pre :
if U.dept != 'HR':
qs = qs.filter(id=U.id)
return qs
The policy above checks if the current user (identified by U) is in
the HR department. If so, the policy doesn’t add any filters to the
original query. If not, the policy ensures that the user accesses only
his/her own record. The variable qs refers to the query (queryset
object) that will be executed on the database while filter adds ad-
ditional constraints on the query. In the above example, the filter
removes those rows whose id is not equal to the id of the current
user. Estrela stores the data about the current user in U, which is
exposed to the policy enforcement engine.
Example 2 (Query-level partial access). In certain cases, instead
of denying access entirely, the application needs to release some
information about a sensitive datum such as an aggregate statistic
or a derived value. In many cases, these policies can be expressed
as query-level policies in Estrela. In our running example, suppose
that the policy requires that managers can access the average salary
of all employees in the organization, but non-manager employees
can only access the average for other non-manager employees:
Avg(Payroll.salary); pre :
mgr = Payroll.objects.values_list('mgid', flat=True)
if U.id not in mgr:
qs = qs.exclude(id__in=mgr)
return qs
The above policy is enforced when the average of employee salaries
is accessed by an employee. The policy, initially, retrieves the
employee-ids of all managers in the organization. The function
values_list returns a list of rows of only those columns that are
specified as an argument to the function. If the current user is a man-
ager, it returns the average of salaries of all employees. Otherwise,
it removes the salaries of those employees who are managers before
computing the average using the exclude function that removes
rows satisfying the condition.
Example 3 (Row-level context-dependent partial release). There
are other cases where the developer might want to release partial
information about the sensitive information, which might vary
according to the context. In Estrela, these policies are most nat-
urally expressed as row-level policies that are applied to a set of
query results using the row object. This is denoted with the post
annotation at the top of the policy.
Suppose the application enforces a policy that the address of an
employee is selectively visible to other employees, such that only
the employee can see his/her complete address, employees in the
Transportation department can see the neighborhood of an em-
ployee to arrange a drop-off, and all other employees can only see
the city name. As query-level policies apply on the queryset object
and not on individual rows, it is not possible to return different val-
ues for different rows. Although such policies are not API-specific,
they cannot be specified as query-level policies. The policy given
below demonstrates how a row-level policy can post-process results
to enforce this constraint:
1 User.address; post :
2 if row.id == U.id:
3 pass
4 elif U.dept == "Transportation":
5 row.address = getngh(row.address)
6 else:
7 row.address = getcity(row.address)
8 return row
This example returns different values based on the context. If the
current user is the employee itself, then the user is allowed access
to the complete address (line 2). If the user is in the Transporta-
tion department (line 4), the user can see the neighborhood of the
employee’s address. If none of the two conditions hold (line 4), the
user sees only the city of the employee.
It is instructive to see how this policy differs from prior work like
Qapla [18], which also requires user-defined functions like getngh
and getcity for specifying such policies. In Qapla, the developer has
to invoke the correct function, e.g., getngh(address) if the user is
in the Transportation department and getcity(address) if the user
does not satisfy any criterion, to get access to the address. If the
developer queries the wrong function, she does not get access to
the address. In Estrela, the row-level policy takes care of this; thus
no modification to the application or its API is required.
Example 4 (API-specific differential access). A more interesting
scenario arises when the developer wants to specify a policy that
indicates only the existence of a sensitive value in certain cases,
and in other contexts reveals more information. This corresponds
to the calendar example discussed in the introduction, wherein the
app allows users to create new events and invite other employees
to the events.
def get_events(request):
e = EventCalendar.objects.all()
...
def delete_events(request):
e = EventCalendar.objects.all()
...
def get_location_events(request, loc):
e = EventCalendar.objects.filter(location=loc)
...
Listing 1: APIs exposed by event calendar service
Consider three resources identified by APIs get_events, delete_-
events and get_location_events shown in Listing 1. The API
get_events returns a list of events, the API delete_events returns
a list of events that can be deleted, and the API get_location_-
events returns the list of events organized at the location identified
by loc. The system enforces a query-level policy that allows a user
to see only those events that the user is invited to. When accessed
through the delete_events API, the system enforces a query-level
policy that allows the user to see only those events that the user
created. However, when viewing the list of events at a location,
the user besides getting the details of the events to which she is
invited should also see “Private event” for other events along with
3
1 EventCalendar.∗; pre :
2 return qs.filter(eid__in=Invitee.objects.filter(empid=U.id).
values_list('eid',flat=True))
3
4 EventCalendar.∗; pre; [delete_events] :
5 return qs.filter(orgid=U.id)
6
7 EventCalendar.∗; post; [get_location_events] :
8 if not Invitee.objects.filter(eid=row.eid, empid=U.id).exists():
9 row.event = "Private event"
10 row.orgid = 0
11 return row
Listing 2: Policies enforced by event calendar service
their date and time so that she cannot schedule another event at
the same location at the given time.
As getting a list of events is subject to the query-level policy
that returns only those events that the user is invited to, a policy
needs to be specified specifically for APIs accessing events to delete
some events, e.g., delete_events, and at a location, e.g., get_loc-
ation_events. The list of specified policies is shown in Listing 2.
For API-specific policies, the list of APIs that these policies apply to
are specified after the pre or post annotation. If the value is omitted,
the policy applies to all APIs. When the list of events is accessed
via get_events, it applies the query-level policy defined on line 1
and returns only those events that the user is invited to. The ‘∗’ in
the policy indicates that the policy applies every time the table is
queried. When the list of events is accessed via delete_events, it
applies the query-level policy defined on line 4 overriding the policy
defined on line 1 as it is API-specific, and returns only those events
that the user has created. When the list of events at a given location
is accessed via get_location_events, it retrieves all events from
the database at that location as the row-level policy defined on
line 7 overrides the query-level policy. The policy then returns the
details of all the events in that list the user is invited to and “Private
event” for all other events (line 9) with the organizer’s data hidden
and their scheduled date and time.
As shown in the examples above, certain policies like limiting
access to rows in a column or a join of columns, or limiting the data
used for computing an aggregation, can be specified as query-level
policies using filters before the query is executed while contextual-
policies require post-processing and are specified as row-level poli-
cies operating on the result of the query.
3 POLICY FRAMEWORK
Estrela supports the specification and enforcement of a rich class
of policies, which have the following form:
t1.f1, . . . , tn .fn ; φ; A : P
In this expression, P is the policy body containing executable code
that either rewrites a query or filters a set of results;A is an optional
API identifier; φ is either pre or post; and ti .fi is a column identifier
from the target database schema.
The policy P applies when t1.f1, . . . , tn .fn are accessed in a query.
φ indicates whether the policy is a query-level policy (pre) or row-
level policy (post) depending on which the policy is applied before
or after the query is executed.
P is a function that works on either a queryset object (denoted by
qs in the policy) for query-level policies, or a row (denoted by row
in the policy) for row-level policies. P always returns a modified
queryset object or row, respectively. Policies can additionally be
associated with a transformation function on a field, e.g., Avg in
Example 2, in which case one of the ti .fi is replaced with Fi (ti .fi )
where Fi is the transformation function used on ti .fi .
A is an optional field that contains the list of APIs for which
the current policy applies. Based on the API through which the
data is accessed, the policies with A specified take precedence and
override other policies. If A is omitted from the policy, then the
post policy is applied for every API after the results of the query
filtered by the pre policies are returned to the API.
The policies, additionally, have access to the current user au-
thenticated with the system and the API that made the query to the
database, which are extracted from the request sent to the server
from the client. The current user is represented as U in the policies.
If the user is not authenticated with the server, the user is treated
as an anonymous user. The policy selection algorithm checks if the
current API is present in the A field of the policy and returns the
policies that apply for that API. Policies that do not have the A field
apply to all data accesses unless a policy with A is specified.
In case policies are specified for t1.f1, t2.f2, and t1.f1, t2.f2, all
three policies are applied when accessing t1.f1, t2.f2. If no policy
applies on a query, the default policy returns no rows to account
for missed policies.
The policies are applied considering all the fields used in the
query irrespective of where they appear in the query. While this
may at first seem too conservative, it is necessary to prevent implicit
information leaks, as might be the case when, for example a query
returns the names of all employees of a particular age. The policies
for accessing name, and name and age together may be different
as defined below:
User.name; pre :
return qs
User.name, User.age; pre :
return qs.filter(id = U.id)
If the policy were based only on the selected name column, it would
apply a relaxed policy that allows the names of all employees having
the particular age to be displayed as the first policy does not apply
any filter for access of name. However, as the two columns are
linked in the query, the correct policy would be the second one
associated with both name and age that reveals to the user his/her
own name and age only and no additional information because of
accessing name and age together. To handle such leaks, all columns
used in the query are considered when selecting the policy to apply
on the query.
Query-level policies. Query-level policies are associated and spec-
ified along with the database schema or model, and apply based
on which tables and fields (and their transformations) are queried
for. These policies add additional filters to the queryset object by
adding either conditions in the query’s where clause or additional
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Figure 1: Application architecture with Estrela
subqueries, thereby limiting the information returned by the data-
base and the rows being accessed by the query.
Row-level policies. Row-level policies apply on the result of a
query, which is a sequence of rows returned to the API. They apply
to every row in the query’s result, and aremainly contextual policies.
They modify the result of the query, i.e., some values in the result,
based on the context, and return the modified set of rows. Only the
field(s) for which the policy is specified is(are) modified while other
fields in the result remain unchanged.
Application architecture with Estrela. Figure 1 describes the appli-
cation architecture with the policy enforcement mechanism using
Estrela. The overall workflow of the architecture is as follows:
(1) The server accepts incoming requests on different APIs
and performs the required query on the database.
(2) Query-level policies associated with the data being re-
trieved are applied as filters on the query before the object
is fetched from the database.
(3) The filtered query is then executed on the database, which
gets some data from the database.
(4) Once the data is fetched, the row-level policies that apply
on the result of the query modify the query’s result-set.
(5) The API performs any necessary computations on the data
retrieved, and creates and sends the response to the client.
Discussion. While row-level policies are at least as expressive
as query-level policies, enforcing query-level policies has certain
advantages. Firstly, as query-level policies are applied before the
query is evaluated by adding filter conditions or subqueries, the
database is queried only once. This enhances the performance of
the policy-framework as row-level policies require more database
hits (as the policy queries the database again). Secondly, query-level
policies prevent timing-related leaks that are possible with row-
level policies. As they are applied before the database is queried,
they do not reveal any information about the number of records
satisfying the original unfiltered query. For instance, suppose, in
a healthcare setting, a user wants to know how many patients
have a certain disease, but say, they are not allowed to access this
information. With row-level policies, the time taken to first retrieve
the list of patients that have a certain disease and then filtering the
results might be significant, dominating the time to respond to the
query. Therefore, if it takes a long time to respond, this may leak
some information on what the query response size was to the user,
even though the result itself contains no sensitive information.
However, row-level policies allow partial release of sensitive
information based on the context making it flexible enough to
handle cases where different values need to be returned as per the
context. Moreover, it is not possible to enforce all policies at the
query-level as some policies need post-processing; thus, requiring
these policies to be specified as row-level. Row-level policies are
also useful when some additional information that is not present
in the result of the filtered query needs to be released.
4 ENFORCING ESTRELA POLICIES
Estrela provides two mechanisms for automatically enforcing a
given set of policies: default framework enforcement for applica-
tions that are written in Estrela, and remote-server enforcement
for language-agnostic enforcement that is compatible with applica-
tions written partly in Estrela or entirely in another language. Each
approach has unique strengths and weaknesses, which we discuss
in this section and evaluate in Section 5.
4.1 Threat Model
Estrela aims to provide a unified, practical, and robust framework
for specifying and enforcing policies over back-end databases in
web applications. The primary security goal of Estrela is to ensure
that the database queries and the APIs tagged with a particular
policy satisfy the privacy conditions specified in the policy. We
are particularly interested in access policies that apply when the
data is read from the database and limit the scope of our paper
to those. However, policies that govern what data is written to
the database can also be specified in a similar fashion (see, e.g.,
delete_events in Listing 2). We assume that developers make a
good-faith effort to specify correct policies, and that the integrity
of the Estrela framework implementation and policy server is in-
tact and uncompromised throughout the lifetime of the application.
Estrela does not attempt to prevent leaks from hardware or operat-
ing system-level side channels, or by groups of users who collude
via out-of-band channels to learn more than what is specified in
the policy. Likewise, as Estrela policies concern server-side data,
leaks that result from vulnerabilities in the client-side browser or
operating system are also not in scope for our security goal.
4.2 Framework Enforcement
Estrela extends Django [11], a Python-based model-view-template
Web application framework. Thus, apps written in Estrela are oth-
erwise standard Django applications with additional policy spec-
ifications provided as described in Section 3. Policies are speci-
fied alongside the database schema using two class-methods (for
query-level and row-level policies) that are inherited by all models
(schemas). If these methods are not overriden by a model, then a
default conservative policy that suppresses all results applies.
To enforce a query-level policy, we augment the database in-
terface functions provided by Django via monkey-patching, which
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amounts to inheriting from Django’s classes and overloading the
methods relevant to Django’s object-relational mapping. The total
implementation consists of about 700 lines of Python code. Using
this approach, we achieve complete mediation so that all database
accesses in an Estrela application occur through the instrumented
methods. These methods are responsible for invoking the policy
functions, and passing them the current user and API information
that Estrela exposes from the request to the server. Django con-
structs a queryset as soon as an API starts querying for some data in
the database; however, it does not evaluate the queryset to reduce
the number of database hits. As Django supports lazy evaluation,
the methods are modified to apply the query-level policies just
before the query is evaluated to get better performance.
To enforce a row-level policy, we modify the results returned
from the database and selectively apply the relevant policy func-
tions before the results are returned to the APIs. Selective enforce-
ment is achieved by a case analysis on the fields involved in the
query, to determine which policies are relevant. When multiple poli-
cies apply on the result of an API call, we assume an arbitrary but
fixed order in which to apply the policy functions to the queryset
result.
Both query- and row-level policies need to consult the set of
active API-specific policies to bypass enforcement when operating
in the context of a relevant API.
4.2.1 Integrating with Legacy Django Applications. As Es-
trela is built on top of Django, migrating an existing Django appli-
cation to Estrela is straightforward and does not require changes
to the core application code. The developer only needs to specify
the policies alongside the data models (i.e., the database schema),
which are modified to inherit from Estrela’s model class. The only
other necessary change is to expose the request parameters of each
API to the policy enforcement mechanism, which is taken care
of automatically by Estrela using a middleware configured in the
application’s settings.
4.3 Language-Agnostic Enforcement
Using the built-in framework enforcement mechanism, porting
applications not built in Django to Estrela will require significant
effort, and in some cases may need to be re-implemented from
scratch. To reduce this burden as much as possible, we extend
Estrela to provide a language-agnostic enforcement mechanism.
However, modern web applications run multiple services, e.g., mi-
croservices, that might be written in multiple languages. Such an
architecture imposes additional challenges that influence the design
of our language-agnostic framework:
(1) Porting every service to Estrela separately would require
separate policy specification and enforcement mechanisms
for each service, even though the back-end database is the
same. This would require building an Estrela-like frame-
work for different languages for policy enforcement.
(2) Multiple policy specifications would result in redundant
policies, modifications or updations to which need to be
propagated across all the services. This might result in
additional policy-compliance bugs being introduced in the
application.
Ideally, the policies should be specified centrally for a database
schema and applied across all services uniformly without requiring
a separate enforcement mechanism for every service, which can
be enforced via two different approaches. First, one may build an
interface on top of the database that modifies all queries coming
in to the database and the results going out of the database for
enforcing policies centrally. However, this requires two different
policy specification and enforcement mechanisms — one which
modifies the queries where the policies can be specified declara-
tively, e.g., in SQL, for enforcement at that abstraction; and another
that needs to be specified imperatively, e.g., in C++, to check every
row in the result-set for policy-compliance. Second, it is possible
to build a central service with a single policy specification that
enforces policies on the results of the database queries. While this
approach incurs additional overheads when the policies could have
been enforced before query-execution, the enforcement is central
and introduces lesser bugs due to updation and maintenance.
In this work, we opt for the second approach. We deploy Estrela
as an additional service on the server (denoted as policy-server
throughout this section), where it interposes on the services used
by the application to enforce the specified policies. Policies are
specified centrally in the service hosting Estrela and enforced across
all services.
4.3.1 Policy-server. The policy-server can enforce policies for
any web app that uses a decoupled server-client architecture with
a uniform interface to identify resources on the server. Importantly,
this encompasses the Representational State Transfer (REST) ar-
chitectural style, which exposes a uniform resource interface and
loosely binds the client and server-side code [13]. A large number of
modern, widely-used Web services, such as Twitter, Facebook, and
Gmail, use this architecture [33], while others continue to migrate
to it [4, 17, 29]. REST services identify resources on the server via
a well-defined web API, and typically encode responses as either
JSON or XML strings. This makes it straightforward to associate
row-level policies with each REST API provided by a service, which
modify the string representation of the response object produced by
these APIs. Additionally, the policy-server can access the database
queried by the legacy services as needed to evaluate these policies.
4.3.2 Policy contract. As all database accesses in legacy ap-
plications occur through APIs and the enforcement mechanism is
not tightly coupled with every service, Estrela’s language-agnostic
enforcement only enforces API-specific row-level policies. Like-
wise, in this setting they cannot be specified alongside the Django
data model of a particular service. The policies are specified as con-
tracts [19] that are associated with different services. In general, a
contract specifies the expected functionality of a particular function
or the API when it is invoked under pre-determined conditions; a
policy contract in Estrela specifies what information is allowed to
be accessed through each API, and how sensitive information is
handled by those APIs with respect to a particular context.
In further detail, policy functions are specified in Python in a
similar fashion to row-level policies in the native framework, and
they perform specific checks on the sequence of data objects (à la
rows in row-level policies) returned by an API. Policy functions are
denoted by the @policy_fn tag, take at least three arguments - user,
obj, and state. The policy is applied on the record identified by obj
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in the context of the current user, user. The state parameter keeps
track of the internal state and is used for optimization purposes.
The sequence of field-value pairs in obj indicate the data accessed
by the API. Policy functions return Boolean results along with
the modified set of fields and values for the object. The Boolean
value indicates whether changes are required to the response object
w.r.t. the current user – True indicates that the data is visible and
policy-compliant in the current context and can be sent without any
modifications; False indicates that the data is not policy-compliant
in the current context, and based on whether a value is specified
or not, it respectively returns the new specified value or hides the
object completely. Any policy that can be written inline can be
specified as a policy function.
The policies are enforced using tags attached to the APIs exposed
by the service. They are specified only for those APIs that need to
modify the response object. Modifying the response object leverages
any checks added previously as part of the API code. Policies are
attached to API calls using the @policy_apply tag (lines 22 and 30
in Listing 3), which indicates that a set of API-specific policies
apply to that API; the set of applicable policies are names of policy
functions defined previously specified as a list through the return
value of the API. Policies are applied just before the API sends the
response, and work on the response object that the API constructs.
The enforcement mechanism ensures that only those policies that
are associated with the API are applied.
Listing 3 shows the contract for a service (Example 4 from Sec-
tion 2) that exposes three APIs shown in Listing 1. As before,
the APIs get_events, delete_events, and get_location_events
return a list of events, a list of events that the user can delete, and
the list of events organized at the location identified by loc, respec-
tively. Recall that the three policies enforced by the system are: (1)
a user is allowed to see only those events that the user is invited
to (lines 1-6); (2) when viewing the list of events at a location, the
user should see the details of the events to which (s)he is invited,
but see only “Private event” for other events (lines 15-20); (3) users
can delete only those events that they have created (lines 8-13).
We illustrate how the policies in Listing 3 are enforced. When
the list of events is accessed via get_events on line 23, it applies
events_policy (line 24) and returns only those events that the user
is invited to as the return valueFalse on line 6 removes those records
that the user does not have access to. When the list of events is
accessed via delete_events on line 27, it applies delete_events_-
policy (line 28) and returns only those events that the user has
created. When the list of events at a given location is accessed via
get_location_events, it applies location_events_policy (line 32).
The policy, then, returns the details of all the events in that list the
user is invited to (line 18), and “Private event” for all other events
with their organizer’s id set to 0 (line 20).
4.3.3 Implementation. Estrela’s language-agnostic implemen-
tation consists of a library that implements the functionality of the
two functions over 50 lines of Python code. The tags @policy_fn
and @policy_apply are implemented as a function decorator. A dec-
orator is a function that takes a reference to another function as an
argument, and modifies its functionality dynamically by perform-
ing pre- and post-function call operations, without modifying the
existing function [25]. The pre-function call operations can modify
1 @policy_fn
2 def events_policy(user, obj, state):
3 if Invitee.objects.filter(eid=obj['eid'],empid=user.id).exists():
4 return True, {}
5 else:
6 return False, {}
7
8 @policy_fn
9 def delete_events_policy(user, obj, state):
10 if obj['orgid'] == user.id:
11 return True, {}
12 else:
13 return False, {}
14
15 @policy_fn
16 def location_events_policy(user, obj, state):
17 if Invitee.objects.filter(eid=obj['eid'],empid=user.id).exists():
18 return True, {}
19 else:
20 return False, {'event': 'Private event', 'orgid': 0}
21
22 @policy_apply
23 def get_events(request):
24 return [events_policy]
25
26 @policy_apply
27 def delete_events(request):
28 return [delete_events_policy]
29
30 @policy_apply
31 def get_location_events(request, loc):
32 return [location_events_policy]
Listing 3: Policy contract for event calendar service
the arguments being passed to the function while the post-function
call operations generally work on the return value of the function
call. Using the decorators, the policies can be specified together
as a set of arguments separately from the API code, and applied
whenever the API is invoked.
The decorator@policy_fnwraps the policy function and dictates
how the policy applies on the data. Inside the function, we iterate
through the list of rows that the API call returns and apply the
policy on each row. This function also defines the internal state
that the policy uses for optimization. The policies can be reused
for different APIs if the two APIs access the same fields from the
database. For enforcing policies, the tag @policy_apply takes a set
of policies as the return value of the API definition, and works on
the response object created by the API. Each policy in the set is then
applied to the response object, which returns a possibly modified
response object that the API can return to the client.
Figure 2 shows the workflow with language-agnostic extension
of Estrela. The application services register a middleware to talk
to the policy-server, which routes the requests being sent to the
service and the responses being sent back from the service through
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Figure 2: Language-agnostic enforcement using Estrela
the policy-server. The policy-server receives the request from the
middleware on a particular interface that corresponds to the inter-
face at the actual server on which the original request was received.
The policy-server then enforces the policies on the object received
through the request and sends it back to the middleware service as
a new response object, which is then forwarded to the client. The
only modifications required in this enforcement is the addition of a
middleware to existing services that talks to the policy-server for
enforcement. This is similar to how Whip [36] intercepts requests
and responses for checking specifications.
5 EVALUATION
We evaluate Estrela by comparing the code changes required on
existing applications and the overhead it incurs due to the policy
checking. We demonstrate that Estrela is easy to integrate with
existing applications, and incurs very low overheads, showing its
effectiveness and usefulness. We consider open-source applications
for migration to Estrela that are built using Django.
5.1 Methodology and Setup
We used Estrela to build a few applications with policy enforcement
ranging from about 1000 LOC to 80 kLOC. The first is a version of
Spirit [32], a Django-based forum software where users can discuss
on different topics, migrated to Estrela with policy enforcement.
The second is a social-networking site, à la Twitter, which allows
users to post messages and to follow other users’ activity. The third
is a multi-user conference management system that lets users add,
edit, remove papers for a conference. The fourth application is a
company’s intranet website on the lines of the example discussed
in Section 2. For the second case-study, we add a new middleware
to the application by modifying the configuration of the applica-
tion to send the response objects to the policy-server while the
application code remains unchanged. For the other case-studies, we
add a middleware to expose the request details to the schema for
evaluating the policies in Estrela. All other code in the application
remains the same.
The baseline implementations of our case-studies are all built
using Django with policies included in the code, allowing us to
evaluate the performance of Estrela. We also measure the perfor-
mance of Estrela when hosted on a separate policy-server with
respect to an implementation built in Django REST framework
having intertwined policies.
We ran our experiments on a MacBook Pro having an 8 GB RAM
and 3.1 GHz Intel Core i5 processor, running macOS Mojave 10.14.3.
We automated the process of sending requests to the server to get
access to the information, and measured the average time taken for
processing the request and policy enforcement over 100 trials. The
server, policy-server, and the client run on the same machine so the
evaluation results do not include network latency or the time taken
for rendering. We ran this process in the context of a particular
user, who is authenticated while sending the request. We modified
Django-timelog [27] to log the time taken in different scenarios.
The standard deviations for the results are all below 5%.
In the following sub-sections, we describe the functionality of
these applications, the policies that we apply, and how these poli-
cies are implemented and enforced using Estrela. We report the
performance numbers for these case-studies, by measuring the time
taken by the application to perform user operations in different
scenarios. §5.2.1 and §5.3.1 shows the code changes required for
the implementations to enforce policies in their respective settings.
5.2 Case Study: Spirit Forum Software
Spirit is a Django-based forum software for facilitating conversa-
tions and discussions amongst users. The original software con-
tains about 80 kLOC. Users can create new conversations or post
comments on existing conversations depending on the visibility
of the conversation and/or whether the user has been invited to
the conversation or not. The schema of the actual site contains
28 tables with 165 columns. We specified query-level policies for
various tables and measured the overhead incurred by Estrela, and
demonstrate the ability of Estrela to scale to large applications.
5.2.1 Migration Effort. We modified the models’ base class in
the original software to use Estrela’s model as the base class. This
required a modification of about 30 LOC in the original software.
The other modification required apart from the specification of
policies was to expose the incoming request to the models for
identifying the current user and the API that requested the data,
which require a couple of lines of code to be added to the settings
of the application.
We enforce a policy associated with various topics in the forum
that allows only logged-in users to view the topics. Without the
policy enforcement, Spirit shows all public topics even without a
user being logged-in to the system. In Estrela, we added a policy
that checks if the current user is authenticated or not; if not, it does
not show any topics to the user. In the original version of Spirit,
this check has to be propagated to at least three different files in
the codebase, all of which access the topic and display it to the user
reiterating the need for centralized specification of policies.
5.2.2 Performance. We added a few users and topics to the
database and evaluate the time taken to access the topics with
different users. The result of our experiment is shown in Figure 3.
Estrela incurs an average overhead of about 0.0002s or 0.8% when
accessing the topics as an authenticated user. When accessing the
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def posts_view(request):
posts = Post.objects.all()
return Response(PSerial(posts, many=True).data)
Listing 4: Application code for returning all posts in a serialized manner
def posts_view(request):
u = request.user
if not u.is_authenticated():
posts = []
else:
posts = Post.objects.all()
f_ids = u.follow.values_list('id', flat=
True)
for post in posts:
u_id = post.user.id
if u_id not in f_ids or u_id != u.id:
post.msg = 'Follow user to see the
contents of post'
return Response(PSerial(posts, many=
True).data)
Listing 5: Policy specified in Django’s
implementation of Vataxia
Post.∗; post:
if not U.is_authenticated():
row = None
else:
if 'f_ids' in state:
f_ids = state['f_ids']
else:
f_ids = U.follow.values_list('id',
flat=True)
state['f_ids'] = f_ids
u_id = row.user.id
if u_id not in f_ids and u_id != U:
row.msg = 'Follow user to see the
contents of post'
return row
Listing 6: Policy enforcement for
Vataxia with schema in Estrela
@policy_fn
def posts_policy(user, obj, state):
if not user.is_authenticated():
return False, {}
elif 'f_ids' in state:
f_ids = state['f_ids']
else:
f_ids = [u.id for u in user.follow.all()]
state['f_ids'] = f_ids
u_id = obj['user']['id']
if u_id in f_ids or u_id == user.id:
return True, {}
else:
return False, {'msg': 'Follow user to
see the contents of post'}
@policy_apply
def posts_view(request):
return [posts_policy]
Listing 7: Policy contract for Vataxia
in Estrela’s policy-server
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Figure 3: Time taken to request and access different topics
in the forum with Django as the baseline
topics as an anonymous user, Estrela incurs an overhead of about
0.001s or 6.5%, which is mainly due to Django’s lazy evaluation
in Estrela. With Estrela, the policies are applied just before the
evaluation after the objects have be created even if the objects are
never required in the future resulting in the additional overhead.
The inline check in Django can be added as early as possible in the
API code preventing the creation of objects, thereby avoiding the
additional overhead.
5.3 Case Study: Social-networking Site
Social-networking sites involve multiple users posting information
and sharing it with other users. Users can track the activity of other
users by “following” them. We modify an existing open-source
social-networking site, Vataxia [26], by implementing additional
functionality to follow users and view a user’s posts. The application
allows new users to be added to the system and to search for users
to follow their posts. The original schema contained the following
models – User, Post, PrivateMessage, Reply and Vote; we extend
User by adding a field, follow, to include a list of users that the
user is following. The table Post contains a field user referencing
User table, and the message that the user has posted in msg. The
front-end of the application is written in ReactJS while the back-end
is developed using Django REST framework [10] using Django 2.1
and Python 3.6.5.
5.3.1 Migration Effort. We port the social-networking site to
Estrela by adding policies for various tables. The original applica-
tion contains around 19 kLOC as part of the front-end and 2 kLOC
in the back-end. To show the applicability of the language-agnostic
extension of Estrela, we enforce the policies on the REST APIs ex-
posed by Vataxia’s back-end using the policy-server. We define the
policy contract and an interface in the policy-server similar to the
one exposed in the original application where we attach the policies
to the APIs. In Estrela, we modify the models of the application
to inherit from Estrela’s base class requiring around 10 lines to be
modified in the application, and the addition of the middleware
that exposes the request to the models. For the policy-server, we
include a middleware to intercept the request and response being
sent to/from the server, and pass them to the policy-server for pol-
icy enforcement. Below, we show the enforcement of a policy that
limits the posts that a user can view based on whether the user is
following the user whose posts are being accessed or not.
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Figure 4: Normalized time taken to access all posts through
a REST API with policy in code as the baseline
For code comparison, the policy codes for Vataxia are shown in
Listings 7, 5 and 6 for policy in policy-server, views, and schema
with Estrela, respectively. We use state in Listing 6 for optimization
purposes to prevent multiple database hits to retrieve the list of
users the current user is following. Although the policies are similar
across the three Listings, the developer has to add the policy for
every access of Postwhen adding checks in the API code (Listing 5).
5.3.2 Performance. We added 1000 users and their details to
the database for the social-networking site with every user follow-
ing 0 − 3 other users in the system. We measure the time taken to
access posts in the system for different number of posts (ranging
from 8 posts to 1024 posts). The posts are generated automatically
before the processing starts and related to random users. Figure 4
shows the normalized time taken in different scenarios. The average
overhead for accessing all posts with Estrela when compared to the
baseline of policy in the application code is around 2.3%.
The policy in Estrela applies on the result before it is returned,
but incurs the overhead due to the additional check for obtaining
the users that the current user is following (which is optimized
by storing additional information in state); the enforcement time
for the policies is almost the same as with policies intertwined
with the code. The average overhead for accessing all posts with
policies enforced through the policy-server against having policies
in code is around 8.5%. Most of the overhead is due to the additional
network requests and responses between the server and the policy-
server. The overheads have a visible effect when the policy-server
is handling lesser number of objects because with more objects, the
time to serialize these objects dominates the time to retrieve them
from the database.
5.4 Case Study: Conference Mgmt. System
We modify an existing conference management system built in
Jacqueline [37], using Django, that has been deployed to manage
paper reviewing process for an academic workshop (PLOOC 2014),
to work without information flow tracking in place and migrate
it to Estrela. This modified application contains about 4 kLOC re-
taining the features of the existing system like creating users and
conferences, adding papers and roles for users, etc. while removing
its dependence on the Jeeves [38] library and the functionality to
Table Policy - User can access
User either her own profile or another user’s profile if she is
the chair or in the pc
Paper any paper if she is the chair
Paper papers with which she is not conflicted if she is in the pc
Paper papers which she has co-authored
Paper accepted status of a paper either if she is the chair, or if
she is the co-author and phase is final
Paper number of submitted and accepted papers if phase is final
Table 2: Policies for the conference management system
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Figure 5: Normalized time taken to access all papers and
users with Django as the baseline
handle faceted values; the database also does not contain additional
fields for handling facets. The system supports single-blind submis-
sion, handling conflicts, and submission of reviews and comments
by reviewers. Every conference has three phases - submission, re-
view and final - which influence the policies. We enforce the policies
shown in Table 2 on different tables in the schema.
5.4.1 Performance. We created a dummy conference with
1000 users (25 of them on the pc), and 1000 papers submitted by
randomly chosen authors with 2 co-authors each. The policy for
User table shown in Table 2 is a query-level policy while Paper has
a mix of both. Figure 5 shows the normalized time taken to access
all papers and users in the system with Django as the baseline. The
performance of Estrela when accessing the list of users incurs an
overhead of about 0.6%. Estrela incurs an additional overhead of
around 1.5% as compared to Django when accessing the list of pa-
pers due to the number of policies (both query-level and row-level)
associated with the Paper table.
5.5 Case Study: Company Intranet
As a microbenchmark to evaluate the performance of Estrela when
enforcing different kinds of policies shown as examples in Section 2,
we implement an intranet website in Estrela that handles employees’
personal and official information. The employees of the company
can access their profiles, payroll information, their friends’ profiles,
and can schedule events or meetings within the company as de-
scribed earlier in Section 2 extended with an additional Friends
table that contains a list of friends in the organization. A brief de-
scription of the policies that we enforce is shown in Table 3. The
policy-compliant queries executed on the database through Django
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Query Policy - Employee can access
Q1 only her friends’ ages
Q2 all employee details if she is in the HR department; if
not, only her own details
Q3 average salary of employees who are not managers unless
she is a manager
Q4 address of her friends but sees only the city name for
other employees
Q5 only those events to which she is invited
Q6 events at a particular location but sees “Private event”
for events to which she is not invited
Table 3: Microbenchmark - Policies enforced for the
intranet website
Intranet Examples
N
or
m
al
iz
ed
 E
xe
cu
tio
n 
Ti
m
e
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
1.25
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6
Django Estrela
Figure 6: Normalized execution time for intranet examples
with Django as the baseline
and Estrela are the same. As policies in Estrela use high-level func-
tions that are also used for the inline checks in Django, the modified
query generated in Estrela is the same as the one generated through
Django using inline checks.
5.5.1 Performance. For the intranet example, we added em-
ployee details for 20,000 users in the database with each having
at least 5 friends. Additionally, we added 50 events to test the sce-
narios involving events (Q5 and Q6). The policies for Q4 and Q6
are row-level policies while for the other examples are query-level.
We measure the time taken to access employee and event infor-
mation for the six examples shown in Table 3. The normalized
execution time for the examples with policies enforced in Django
and in Estrela is shown in Figure 6 with Django being the baseline.
The time includes the time taken to send the request, apply the
policy, execute the query, and to send back the response to the
client. The overhead for policy enforcement in Estrela ranges from
−3% when accessing the address to 2.5% when accessing the events
at a particular location. The better performance when accessing the
modified address is due to the enforcement of policies before the
API starts processing the result while for Django the processing
happens after the result has been returned. The additional overhead
for Estrela in other queries is due to the additional checks to select
the correct policies to apply.
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5.6 Policy Complexity
We show in Figure 7, how the complexity of a policy affects the
overhead of Estrela. We create an application in Estrela with a
couple of tables each having 100 columns and a 100,000 rows, and
test the performance for different number of columns being used in
the policy. We ensure that all conditions in the policy are evaluated
to get the worst-case results, and evaluate it for both – Django with
policy in the API code, and Estrela. The overhead that Estrela adds
is almost constant, and does not increase as the complexity of the
policy increases.
6 RELATEDWORK
We describe some of the closely related works to Estrela, most of
which deal with enforcing privacy policies on the server-side of
applications that communicate with a database to retrieve and store
sensitive data. In particular, Estrela allows enforcement of fine-
grained access-control policies on data accessed from the database
and is most closely related to Qapla [18]. Qapla is a framework
to provide fine-grained control of data access by database-backed
applications based on the current context. The policies are specified
as SQL WHERE clauses that define what information is allowed
to be accessed and in what contexts. It works by modifying the
low-level SQL queries being made to the database from the applica-
tion, and adding the policies as sub-queries. However, it does not
support the specification of default values that reveal the existence
of a sensitive value, and does not provide the flexibility of applying
release policies offered by the row-level policies in Estrela. Extend-
ing Qapla to support row-level policies is non-trivial because such
policies cannot be specified as SQL WHERE clauses requiring an
additional policy specification mechanism. Additionally, modifying
existing applications in Qapla might require modification to the
application code to query for the correct column-transformations
without which it would return a more restrictive set of results.
The design of language-agnostic enforcement of policies in Es-
trela is inspired by the work on specifications using contracts in
Whip [36]. While Whip only checks the functionality of APIs using
contracts and does not modify the response being sent to the client,
Estrela uses contracts for specifying privacy policies, and modifies
the response that is sent back to the client.
The other closely related works include policy enforcement
in database-backed applications using information flow tracking,
which we describe next.
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Hails [14] is an MPVC Web framework that adds policies declar-
atively alongside database schemas and tags every piece of data
in the system with a label. These labels are carried around as the
data flows in the system and checked by a trusted runtime when
leaving the system. The focus is to control the flow of data to
untrusted third-party applications by building applications using
the Hails Web platform. Similarly, Jacqueline [37] is a framework
to track information flow in applications dynamically using the
policy-agnostic design paradigm. Jacqueline relies on a modified
database that stores multiple views of data based on who is allowed
to access what. It additionally allows specification of default values,
but does not support policies that are linked to a set of sensitive
fields in the database or policies involving data-aggregates. While
Estrela primarily enforces server-side access-control, it supports
rich contextual policies unlike the other frameworks. Estrela can be
integrated easily with these frameworks for providing fine-grained
access control at the server-side along with information flow track-
ing at the client-side to ensure that the sensitive data does not flow
to unauthorized parties.
Riverbed [35] is another information flow tracking system that
enforces user-specified policies. The client-side communicates to
the server via a proxy that checks if the policies specified by the user
are respected. The server attests to the proxy that it uses a managed
runtime to guarantee that the server-side does not accidentally
leak the data to unauthorized sinks. In contrast, Estrela focuses on
enforcing fine-grained data access policies while making it easier
for the developer to make the application policy-compliant.
FlowWatcher [20] is a system that enforces information flow
policies within a web proxy without requiring any modifications
to the application. However, it is difficult to enforce fine-grained
policies in the system. LWeb [15] is another system that provides
information flow control for web applications developed in Haskell,
which supports both row-level and column-level policies. Similarly,
Daisy [23] provides flow tracking in databases supporting features
like triggers and dynamic policies. However, their monitor supports
only policies that can be expressed in the SQL access control model.
SELinks [8] allows both server-side and database-side enforcement
of policies by compiling server-side functions to user-defined func-
tions that can run on the database for compliance. None of these
systems, however, support contextual policy compliance and are
limited to controlling data disclosure.
Sen et al. [31] propose Legalease language for stating privacy
policies using Deny and Allow clauses and enforce it on big data
systems. The language is simple allowing easy policy specification
by the developers and does partial information flow tracking to
catch violations of privacy policies, but can express only a smaller
subset of policies than Estrela. For instance, Legalease cannot re-
turn parts of sensitive information unless stored explicitly in the
database and queried explicitly for by the application.
Ur/Web [6] is a domain-specific language for programming Web
applications, which includes a static information flow analysis
called UrFlow [5]. Policies are expressed in the form of SQL queries
and can express what information a particular user can learn. Data-
Lawyer [34] is a system to analyze data usage policies that checks
these policies at runtime when a query is made to the database.
The policies are specified in a formal language based on SQL. It
allows quite expressive policies but checks all policies whenever
the database is queried. CLAMP [24] protects sensitive data leakage
fromWeb servers by ensuring that the data can only be accessed by
an authorized user by isolating the application on behalf of different
users. The idea is to isolate user sessions and instantiating a new
virtual Web server instance for every user session. The queries are
restricted to about data accessible by the current user.
SIF [7] is a framework for developing Web applications that
respect some confidentiality policies. The framework is built on top
of Jif [21], an extension of Java with information flow control, and
enforces information flow control in Java Servlets. Besides being
language-specific, SIF also incurs quite some overhead because
of the analysis. SeLINQ [28] is another information flow control
system to enforce policies across database boundaries that modifies
a subset of F# with database queries to perform information flow
analysis. Both these systems label information and track its flow
through the application and guarantee that information flows as per
the policies but are specific to the respective languages. IFDB [30]
enforces information flow control in databases in a decentralized
fashion by associating labels with every data object.
RESIN [39] allows developers to check data-flows in the pro-
gram using assertions, which are checked at sinks in the program
without developer-added checks. It can also express rich policies as
assertions in the program. Nemesis [9] focusses on preventing au-
thentication and access control vulnerabilities in Web applications
by using dynamic information flow tracking.
Passe [3] allows enforcement of learned security policies by
running applications as a set of isolated or sandboxed OS processes
and restricting what data each process can access or modify. The
principle behind Passe is to separate the privileges of various parts
of an application as per its requirements and granting least privilege
access, as required, for running the isolated parts. The constraints
are discovered in a learning phase inferring the data-flows and
control-flows in the application to limit the flow of data. Estrela, on
the other hand, associates developer-specified policies with APIs.
CoSMeDis [2] is a distributed social-media platform that pro-
vides confidentiality guarantees for a set of policies. The policies
are specified as part of the kernel code that is formally verified
in Isabelle proof assistant to guarantee non-interference. The code
is extracted to Scala programming language and requires the pro-
cess to repeat every time a policy is changed or added. A similar
conference management system [16] guarantees server-side non-
interference but has the policies embedded in the formally verified
kernel code that has to be extracted every time the policies change.
7 CONCLUSION
Wepresent Estrela, a web framework that ensures policy-compliance
in Web applications by supporting enforcement of query-level and
row-level policies. Estrela allows specification of rich and expressive
API-specific policies separate from the application code alongside
the database schema. It is prototyped on top of Django and supports
easy migration of legacy applications built using Django for policy-
compliance. We also present a language-agnostic enforcement of
Estrela that allows applications written in multiple languages to
specify and enforce API-specific policies. The language-agnostic
enforcement works on the response object of the APIs, giving it the
12
flexibility to selectively apply policies based on the context and the
requirements. We show the applicability of Estrela by building/mi-
grating four applications on top of it and show that it incurs low
overheads while enforcing expressive policies.
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